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Regulating Financial Markets under Uncertainty: The EU Approach 
Heikki Marjosola
*
 
Abstract:  
This article assesses the European Union’s post-crisis approach to regulating financial markets. Elasticity of 
financial markets forces rule-makers to make choices under uncertainty as to not only how financial markets 
will evolve, but also how regulated actors will respond to the measures adopted. Regulating highly complex 
and dynamic systems such as financial markets requires flexibility and adaptability which traditional 
regulatory techniques and instruments often lack. The European System of Financial Supervision, set up after 
the 2008 financial crisis, has taken a leap towards further harmonisation od rules and vertical consolidation of 
powers. To avoid the risks of stagnation and rigidness, a change in the overall mode of governance is needed. 
This article presents two short cases, one dealing with the modified disclosure regime of the revised 
Transparency Directive and the other with implementation of the Alternative Investment Funds Directive, in 
order to examine how uniformity can be pursued without the corresponding loss of flexibility. The case studies 
demonstrate how the techniques used by the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) and the 
Commission, which involve both formal and informal implementing measures, utilize the procedural flexibility 
of the post-Lisbon EU rule-making. But more flexible EU legislation is also needed because any system of 
delegation is redundant without enabling legislative acts that surrender meaningful normative authority to 
sufficiently independent regulators. The article also discusses the ambiguous limits of the system’s flexibility in 
constitutional terms and addresses certain trade-offs and risks of the emerging mode of governance. 
Keywords: European System of Financial Supervision, European Supervisory Authorities, ESMA, financial 
crisis, harmonisation, single rulebook, governance, Lisbon Treaty, AIFMD, Transparency Directive  
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2 
Introduction 
The evolution of European Union financial regulation is often described as having different 
phases, each with its own characteristics, agendas and specific circumstances.
1
 The origins 
of the present phase lie in the 2007–2008 financial crisis and is characterised, first and 
foremost by an increasing focus on supervision and enforcement of rules (beyond rules in 
books) as well as emphasis on the importance of safeguarding financial stability.
2
 These 
goals have been backed by “far-reaching and radical” institutional reforms which have 
resulted in a novel supervisory architecture known as the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS).
3
 The on-going reforms also have a markedly international dimension: a 
number of legislative initiatives are based on “G20 commitments” and preliminary work 
undertaken by the Financial Stability Board acting under its auspices. 
The more centralised regulatory and supervisory structure works in tandem with the effort to 
further integrate EU financial markets and eradicate unwanted divergence in the financial 
laws and regulations of the Member States. As a token of the prevailing maximum 
harmonization policy, EU institutions and legislative acts now frequently underline the 
Union policy to develop a “single rulebook” for the European financial industry. The newly 
                                                 
1
 See e.g. N. Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 11–16. 
2
 T. Tridimas, “EU Financial Regulation: Federalization, Crisis Management, and Law Reform”, in E. 
Wymeersch, K. Hopt, G. Ferrarini (Eds.) Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 785. On the pursuit of financial stability as a (partly ill-judged) 
driver of EU legal integration, see M. Andenas and I. H.-Y. Chiu, “Financial Stability and Legal Integration in 
Financial Regulation” (2013) 38 E.L. Rev. 335. 
3
 European Commission, Regulating financial services for sustainable growth: A progress report – February 
2011 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/110209_progress_report_financial_issues_en.pdf  
[Accessed March 15, 2014] 
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found, sector-specific European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) are vested with 
considerable authority to implement the rulebook and give guidance with regard to its 
correct application. 
Diminishing competence and discretion of Member States’ competent authorities is highly 
problematic both legally and in terms of governance. But the question that this article 
focuses on is whether the ESFS as a regulatory system is sufficiently flexible in procedural 
or structural terms. The importance of this question is underlined by the fact that the 
broadening perimeter of post-crisis EU financial law makes law reform increasingly 
dependent on centralised EU activity. Accordingly, Professor Tridimas observes that 
maximum harmonisation exposes EU financial regulation to the danger of stagnation and 
risks compromising the regulator’s ability to respond to fast-evolving circumstances. The 
way to deal with this problem, he concludes, would be to preserve enough substantive 
flexibility in legislative acts and to provide an efficient system of delegated legislation.
4
 
More flexible EU legislation and a better functioning system of delegation were targeted 
already by the so-called Lamfalussy approach. The Lamfalussy Report
5
, delivered in 2001, 
identified a lack of flexibility as the principal shortcoming of the EU financial regulation 
and consequent reforms aimed to set up a regulatory structure that would be more flexible 
and less dependent on level 1 legislative input. The call for enhanced flexibility reflected a 
need for faster law-making but, perhaps above all, more adaptable rules. It is a truism that 
financial regulators hardly ever get the regulations right once and for all – once the elastic 
capital markets adjust or innovate, rules often need to be adjusted as well. The result is often 
                                                 
4
 Tridimas, “EU Financial Regulation: Federalization, Crisis Management, and Law Reform” in Wymeersch, 
Hopt, Ferrarini (Eds.) Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (2012), p. 793. 
5
 Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, Brussels, 15 
February 2001. 
  
4 
a dialectic process between financial and regulatory innovation.
6
 But regulators innovate, 
too. Regulatory innovation can involve e.g. rule-making procedures and different regulatory 
instruments. Thus while financial innovation notoriously creates activities and instruments 
that go beyond the regulatory perimeter, regulatory innovation similarly employs new 
regulatory instruments and procedures that can, inter alia, provide more sensitivity to 
changes in regulated markets but which also straddle the constitutional boundaries of rule-
making. 
Indeed, the last decade of EU financial regulation has been particularly active in terms of 
regulatory innovation.
7
 But in the wake of the financial crisis the EU determined (after some 
hesitation) that the Lamfalussy system had serious shortcomings: it had fallen short of 
attaining the dual target of (a) more uniform financial regulation and consistent application 
of rules at the Member State level and (b) less detailed and prescriptive financial legislation 
at the Union level. 
This article examines how the regulatory structure laid down by the ESFS, leveraged by the 
TFEU framework of delegated “non-legislative” rule-making, pursues uniformity with a 
combination of increasingly formal, delegated rule-making and soft, administrative rule-
making that still remains informal and un(der)proceduralised. Two case-studies illustrate the 
role of the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) in both of these rule-making 
techniques: a modified shareholders’ disclosure regime under the revised Transparency 
                                                 
6
 On this kind of elasticity of markets, see F. Partnoy, “Financial Derivatives and the Cost of Regulatory 
Arbitrage” (1996-1997) 22 The Journal of Corporate Law 211, pp. 249–252. The term  “regulatory dialectic” 
was apparently introduced by E.J. Kane. See e.g. Kane, “Interaction of Financial and Regulatory Innovation” 
(1988) 78 The American Economic Review, 328.   
7
 N. Moloney, “Innovation and Risk in EC Financial Market Regulation: New Instruments of Financial Market 
Intervention and the Committee of European Securities Regulators” (2007) 32 E.L. Rev. 627, pp. 631–635. 
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Directive
8
 shows how more functional legislative provisions can promote flexibility, 
whereas the ESMA Guidelines on Key Concepts
9
 of the directive on Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers (AIFMD)
10
 demonstrate how a more informal “perimeter control” can 
promote consistent application of the rulebook. The article seeks to highlight the importance 
of more flexible and adaptable EU legislation. Any system of delegation is redundant 
without enabling legislative acts that surrender meaningful normative authority to 
sufficiently independent regulators. 
The article focuses on securities markets regulation. This choice is not made in neglect of 
the major reforms pending in the area of Eurozone banking supervision. Indeed, the EU is 
about to proceed with yet another financial supervisory reform. The Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) will put in place a highly centralized banking supervision led by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and it presents a decisive step towards a genuine banking 
union.
11
 Although the impacts of pending Eurozone reforms are potentially dramatic, also 
with respect to banking supervisory structures already in place, this article does not analyse 
or anticipate them. However, the findings about the importance of regulatory flexibility are 
equally important in the context of evolving banking supervision. 
                                                 
8
 Directive 2013/50/EU amending Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements 
in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market [2013] 
OJ L294/13. 
9
 Final Guidelines on Key Concepts of the AIFMD, ESMA/2013/611 (13 August 2013). 
10
 Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers [2011] OJ L174/1. 
11
 Council Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] L287/63 and Regulation 022/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) [2013] OJ L287/5. 
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The article also assesses the somewhat ambiguous constitutional boundaries constraining the 
dynamics of EU regulatory innovation because they condition the system’s flexibility and 
play an important part in determining the fate of Europe’s system of financial supervision. 
Finally, certain trade-offs and risks of the emerging mode of governance will be addressed. 
Why regulating financial markets is so difficult  
Before delving into the structure of post-crisis EU financial regulation, it will be briefly 
discussed why regulation of financial markets seems to be such a difficult art. After all, 
every regulatory measure is adopted under uncertainty of how regulated entities and 
individuals will react to new rules (unintended consequences, arbitrage) and how exogenous 
changes such as technological innovation will shape the regulated environment. But 
financial markets provide an example of a border-crossing environment that is particularly 
complex and unpredictable, and thus subject regulatory measures to the constant risk of 
becoming obsolete or at least incomplete. The global financial crisis also highlighted the fact 
that complacent law-makers and regulators can overlook risky trends and have few working 
tools for other than micro-prudential oversight. The years leading to the crisis of 2008 
witnessed a combination of a relatively lax regulatory environment, low interest rates and 
abundant capital with a high yield appetite to fuel the explosive growth of securitized credit 
and different synthetic instruments.
12
 In the meantime, the global system of financial 
                                                 
12
 Financial Services Authority, “Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis” (2009) 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf [Accessed March 15, 2013] and Z. Pozsar, T. Adrian, A. 
Ashcraft, and H. Boesky, “Shadow Banking”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 458, July 
2010 (revised February 2012) http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf [Accessed March 15, 
2013]; and “The origins of the financial crisis: Crash Course” The Economist, September 7, 2013 (Schools 
brief). 
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intermediation reached a level of complexity so incomprehensible that applied physics might 
not be a bad source of inspiration when regulation is being redesigned around the globe.
13
 
However, complexity of financial regulation is also increasing and the regulatory perimeter 
expanding. Especially after the crisis, many areas of the financial industry that used to be 
relatively regulation-free, such as OTC derivatives and hedge funds, are now the primary 
focus of legislators. From the regulator’s corner increasingly complex regulation might just 
respond to the complexity of financial structures, but this causality also works the other way 
around: complex regulation is known to promote complexity in financial structures and 
functions.
14
  
“Futurization” provides a good example of how little of this underlying dialectics has 
changed after the crisis: while the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act
15
 in the United States introduced 
many new rules targeted at previously largely unregulated swaps markets, many issuers 
seem to respond by migrating their swaps into futures markets that will face a less onerous 
regulatory burden.
16
 Futurization is a textbook example of unintended consequences of 
                                                 
13
 S. Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets” (2009) 87 Washington University Law Review 
211, p. 236, noting that the causes of financial market failures are in many ways similar to the non-linear 
feedback effects found by engineers working with complex systems. See also S. Battiston, G. Caldarelli, Co-P. 
Georg, R. May and Stiglitz, “Complex Derivatives” (2013) 9 Nature Physics 123. 
14
 Spatt, “Complexity of Regulation” (2012) 3 Harvard Business Law Review Online, http://www.hblr.org/ 
2012/06/complexity-of-regulation/ [Accessed March 15, 2013]. 
15
 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203, H.R. 4173. 
16
 CME Group Inc. launched a so-called interest-rate swap futures contract, which is basically a futures 
contract that is converted to swaps if held until delivery. “CME Derivatives That Skirt Dodd-Frank Attracting 
Review by CFTC”, Bloomberg Businessweek, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-02-19/cme-
derivatives-skirting-dodd-frank-rules-attract-cftc-review. [Accessed March 15, 2013] Bart Chilton, the 
Commissioner of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading (UTFC), has also expressed his concern at the issue of 
  
8 
financial regulation and also provides a good example of how financial instruments can be 
tailored for regulatory regimes. But it is not all about checks and balances: not every 
financial innovation is a response to regulatory measures and innovation can be driven by 
genuine demand for, by way of examples, risk diversification, smaller transaction costs or 
better access to finance.
17
 In a similar vein, regulation must not only curb and restrain but 
also must facilitate and smooth financial intermediation by upholding the market 
infrastructure, particularly its legal fundamentals. On the other hand, the maxim that 
financial innovation is the “engine driving the financial system toward its goal of greater 
economic efficiency”18 seems much less axiomatic in the post-crisis world. For instance, it 
now seems evident that the shift of risks from the balance sheets of the loan originators to 
global capital markets through complex chains of esoteric securitization techniques does not 
automatically lead to optimal allocation of those risks. Neither does packaging and slicing of 
risk necessarily make it more visible. On this global market for “onions”, where “one peels 
                                                                                                                                                      
converting certain swaps into futures “in an attempt to export the deregulated, opaque swaps trading model to 
these new futures markets”. http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ chiltonstatement013113 
[Accessed March 15, 2013] 
17
 On the benefits of financial innovation, see R. G. Rajan, “Has the Financial Development Made the World 
Riskier?” NBER Working Paper No. 11728, October 2005 (where also the risks of development were famously 
anticipated) See also Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets” (2009) 87 Washington 
University Law Review 211, at p. 213-214, 239. In classifying financial innovations during the 1980s, Finnerty 
found in total 11 different factors. See Finnerty, “Financial Engineering in Corporate Finance: An Overview” 4 
Financial Management (1988), 14–33.  
18
 R. Merton, “A Functional Perspective of Financial Intermediation” (1995) 24 Financial Management 23, pp. 
36–37. 
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successive layers of debt and wonders whether there is any solid core at all”,19 not even the 
seller is necessarily aware of the product’s defects. 
By now it is well understood that non-transparent leverage of many complex financial 
instruments can accumulate hidden debt and risk particularly in a low interest-rate 
environment. Various regulations have been crafted in response to the perceived market 
failures. Regulation of risk-taking and transparency partly works as a substitute for a more 
responsible monetary policy, which remains hostage to stagnant economic growth and 
unemployment.
20
 But the regulatory debate goes beyond individual measures: while most 
agree that regulation is needed, questions of governance continue to spur diverse discussions: 
what kind or regulation is needed and how it should be made and enforced? Traditional 
command and control techniques of regulation have been stated as ill-suited for complex and 
dynamic environments such as financial markets well before the crisis. Instead, techniques 
with more modern features such as flexibility, diversity, experimentalism, and continuing 
deliberation have been promoted. These “new modes of governance” have varying 
characteristics but they commonly prefer networks or similar horizontal governance 
infrastructures to hierarchy with a view to encouraging stakeholder participation – the idea 
being that the relationship between the regulator and the industry should be cooperative, not 
adversarial.
21
 Some of the strategies are dubious of the benefits of hard law instruments in 
                                                 
19
 This apt metaphor is from Richard A. Posner, The Failure of Capitalism: The crisis of ’08 and the descent 
into depression (Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 14. 
20
 On rethinking monetary policy, see Raghurajam G. Rajan in Fault Lines. How Hidden Fractures Still 
Threaten the World Economy. (Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 168–169. 
21
 See generally J. Black, “Paradoxes and Failures: ’New Governance’ Techniques and the Financial Crisis” 
(2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1037; G. de Búrca and J. Scott, “Introduction: New Governance, Law and 
Constitutionalism” in G. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds) Law and New Governance in the EU and The US (Oregon: 
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general, which they consider better suited for relatively stable conditions, and instead 
promote softer measures (i.e. formally non-binding acts) which can be renegotiated and 
reformed in the course of evolving circumstances.
22
 Soft law bodies are also preferred 
because their decision-making structures are more flexible and thus better able to increase 
the agility and adaptability of rule-making.
23
 Although some supervisory regimes with a 
positive attitude towards New Governance ideas failed to anticipate and tackle the crisis, for 
its proponents these failures do not discredit the approach or necessitate a return to 
command and control regulation.
24
 
Against this backdrop, the remainder of this article will analyse the post-crisis EU financial 
supervisory structure and the perceived ability of the prevailing “EU approach” to better 
respond to the challenges of financial markets regulation. 
Updrading the Lamfalussy system 
What the Lamfalussy system did not achieve 
The interplay between financial innovation and regulation has been characteristic of EU 
financial regulation as well. Regulatory initiatives have been mostly reactive: for instance, 
                                                                                                                                                      
Hart Publishing, 2006) p. 3; and C. Ford, “New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation” (2008) 45 American Business Law Journal 1. 
22
 D.M.Trubek, P. Cotterell, and M. Nance, “‘Soft Law’, ‘Hard Law’ and EU Integration” in de Búrca and 
Scott (eds) Law and New Governance in the EU and The US (2006), p. 88 (analysing the EU’s Growth and 
Stability Pact). 
23
 E. Ferran and A. Kern, “Can Soft Law Bodies be Effective? The Special Case of the European Systemic 
Risk Board” (2010) 35 E.L. Rev. 751, p. 756. 
24
 Black, “Paradoxes and Failures: ’New Governance’ Techniques and the Financial Crisis” (2012) 75 Modern 
Law Review 1037 and C. Ford, “Principles-based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis” 
(2010) 55 McGill Law Journal, 257. 
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most initiatives introduced in 1999 under the ambitious Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP)
25
 were designed to respond to unforeseen developments in technology or market 
environment.
26
 But implementation of the FSAP relied on a legislative framework that was, 
according to the Lamfalussy report, “too slow, too rigid, complex and ill-adapted to the pace 
of global financial market change”.27 The objective of the Lamfalussy report’s initiatives 
was therefore to enable faster and better promulgation and implementation of financial rules 
by combining a “more modern, streamlined and flexible decision-making structure” with 
more flexible legislation that could be “adapted more quickly in response to innovation and 
technological change in financial markets.”28 There exist several good overviews of the 
four-level Lamfalussy regulatory structure and they need not be replicated here.
29
 But the 
structure’s overall purpose was to provide flexibility by preserving “level 1” legislative acts 
for high-level principles and policies, whereas more detailed implementation of rules should 
have been left for lower levels of regulation. 
The achievements of the Lamfalussy system were somewhat mixed. It did help to deliver the 
FSAP agenda (totaling 42 measures) on time, and improved the quality of legislation 
through improved consultation processes.
30
 Technical quality was improved with 
                                                 
25
 European Commission, Implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan COM(1999) 232. 
26
 Moloney, EC Securities Regulation (2008) pp. 16–17. 
27
 Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (2001), p. 7. 
28
 European Commission, The Application of the Lamfalussy Process to EU Securities Markets Legislation: A 
preliminary assessment by the Commission services SEC(2004) 1459, p. 3, 12. 
29
 Se eg E. Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 58–126. 
30
 Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group, Final Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process, 15 October 2007, p. 
8. 
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involvement of the three advisory committees (Level 3 Committees) in the regulatory 
process as the committees had the necessary expertise and necessary links to stakeholders.
31
  
But the Lamfalussy approach did not achieve either of its central objectives. First of all, it 
fell short of attaining more uniform and integrated EU securities markets.
32
 The directives 
provided the primary building block of the FSAP securities regulation.
33
 Therefore, 
implementation relied heavily on national measures which were often not only delayed but 
also divergent.
34
 In terms of implementation, horizontality still prevailed.
35
 There were also 
more informal means of promoting convergence, particularly the extensive soft law 
guidance of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR),
36
 but the Member 
States’ acceptance and adoption of non-binding measures remained limited while creative 
transposition measures resulted in divergent outcomes.
37
 In short, it became clear that the 
                                                 
31
 The Lamfalussy Committees consisted of representatives of the respective national supervisory bodies and 
they exercised an important advisory function in developing the legislative and implementing measures. 
32
 L. Enriques, M. Gatti, “Is there a Uniform EU Securities Law After the Financial Services Action Plan?” 
(2008) 14 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 43. 
33
 See the list of adopted measures in European Commission, Review of the Lamfalussy process COM(2007) 
727 final, [2008] OJ C 55, Annex II. 
34
 European Commission, Review of the Lamfalussy process (2007). 
35
 See also R. L. Lastra, “The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe” 
(2003) 10 C.J.E.L. 49, p. 59. 
36
 See N. Moloney, “The Committee of European Securities Regulators and level 3 of the Lamfalussy Process” 
in M. Tison, H. De Wulf, C. Van der Elst, R. Steennot (eds), Perspectives in Company Law and Financial 
Regulation: Essays in Honour of Eddy Wymeersch (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
37
 The Commission was surprisingly optimistic in trusting that non-binding guidance should have prevented 
national regulators from adopting additional measures. European Commission, Review of the Lamfalussy 
process (2007), para. 4.3.2. The CESR’s peer reviews also confirmed divergent outcomes and non-compliance. 
See Ferran, “Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision” in 
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Committees that were designed to drive convergence and consistency in the application and 
implementation of EU financial legislation were failing to deliver. 
Secondly, the FSAP legislation often resulted in excessively detailed provisions, which were 
less principles-based and outcomes-oriented than envisaged by the Lamfalussy principles.
38
 
The likely obstacles were both political and structural: a highly fragmented institutional 
structure and the dynamics of EU federalism promote high level of legislative detail – also 
in securities regulation.
39
 Even where something resembling principles-based legislation was 
produced (e.g. Market in Financial Instruments Directive, MiFID
40
) the EU supervisory 
system was unable to impose sufficiently uniform implementation and application of the 
rules. 
Thus the FSAP rulebook came to be both detailed and divergent, which aggravated 
uncertainty and hindered development of the single financial market. More integrated 
rulemaking was called for in order to create a true level-playing field. The financial crisis 
acted as a final catalyst for stronger EU intervention. 
The European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) 
The spur for structural change after the crisis was given by yet another high-level expert 
report. The group chaired by Jacques de Larosière envisaged a profound review of EU 
supervisory system as well as adoption of a fully harmonized core set of rules that would be 
                                                                                                                                                      
Wymeersch, Hopt, and Ferrarini (eds) Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (2012) pp. 
122–123. 
38
 Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group, Final Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process (2007). 
39
 R. D. Kelemen, Eurolegalism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 97– 116.  
40
 Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments, [2004] OJ L145/1. 
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based on directly applicable regulations.
41
 The Lamfalussy system had reportedly produced 
incoherence either by too much optionality in legislation or by failing to equip level 3 
Committees with necessary powers.
42
 The rationale for prescribed harmonisation echoed the 
concern over the effectiveness of the single financial market, but diversity had also 
compounded the problems of crisis prevention and management.
43
 De Larosière report 
advised that even where directives were needed, maximum harmonization of core issues 
should be achieved.
44
  
These propositions matched the reformist mood of the EU institutions, particularly that of 
the European Parliament.
45
 The Commission followed suit by quickly sketching an outline 
of the renewed supervisory architecture.
46
 Finally, the European Council recommended 
enhancement of both micro and macro-prudential supervisory functions with the 
establishment of new EU level bodies.
47
 Three financial supervisory agencies, the ESMA, 
the EBA and the EIOPA, started their work already in January 2011 when they also assumed 
                                                 
41
 Report by the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 25 
February 2009 (De Larosière report). 
42
 De Larosière report, p. 27 
43
 De Larosière report, p. 27 
44
 De Larosière report, p. 29. 
45
 The Parliament has been the most enthusiastic proponent of a more integrated supervisory framework. See 
e.g. European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 with recommendations to the Commission on 
Lamfalussy follow-up: future structure of supervision, (2008/2148(INI)). 
46
 European Commission, Driving European recovery COM(2009) 114 final; European Commission, European 
financial supervision COM(2009) 252 final. 
47
 European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (18/19 June 2009), paras 19–
20.  
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the tasks of their predecessor committees.
 48
 The ESAs, together with the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) 49 and national competent authorities form the institutional foundations 
of the ESFS (see the table). 
  
                                                 
48
 Respective establishing Regulations are (EU) No. 1093/2010 (EBA), (EU) 1094/2010 (EIOPA), (EU) 
1095/2010 (ESMA) [2010] OJ L331. 
49
 Established by Regulation 1092/201 [2010] OJ L331. 
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The European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) 
EU Level 
 Body Predecessor Lamfalussy 
Committees  
(until January 2011) 
Main tasks/responsibilities 
M
a
cr
o
-
st
a
b
il
it
y
 
European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) 
- Supported and hosted by the European 
Central Bank, the ESRB conducts macro-
prudential oversight of EU financial markets. 
It is designed to prevent or mitigate systemic 
risks to EU's financial stability.  
M
ic
ro
-p
ru
d
e
n
ti
a
l 
 
su
p
er
v
is
io
n
 
European Securities 
Markets Authority 
(ESMA) 
Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) 
In their respective fields, the ESAs 
participate, inter alia in: 
 creation of the “European Single 
Rulebook” 
 prevention of regulatory arbitrage 
 protection of customers 
 maintenance and promotion of stability, 
integrity and transparency of financial 
markets 
 international supervisory coordination 
 direct supervision (e.g. ESMA 
supervises Credit Rating Agencies) 
 enforcement (as a rule subject to 
Commission oversight) 
European Banking 
Authority (EBA) 
Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) 
European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) 
(together, the ESAs) 
Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors 
(CEIOPS) 
 Joint Committee of the 
ESAs 
(3L3 committees) Cooperation to ensure cross-sectoral 
consistency between the ESAs. 
Member State level 
The competent supervisory authorities of the Member States 
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The ESAs were designed to transform the network-based Level 3 committees into 
“supervisory authorities with real teeth”.50 The fulfilment of the ESAs’ objectives was 
considered to require legal personality as well as administrative and financial autonomy.
51
 
Unlike their predecessors, the ESAs are independent legal entities with robust organization 
and institutionalised powers. Their regulatory independence is significantly greater: a 
preamble to their establishing regulations even states that the ESA’s acts should form an 
integral part of Union law.
52
 Notwithstanding, the EU Treaties do not recognize ESAs as 
union institutions and as such their role corresponds with other European agencies 
established by secondary Union law.
53
 
In terms of regulation, the ESAs’ overarching task is twofold: they contribute to (a) 
establishment of high-quality common regulatory and supervisory standards and practices 
and (b) consistent application of legally binding Union acts.
54
 To achieve these objectives, 
they can issue non-binding opinions, guidelines, and recommendations but also develop 
binding technical standards. Finally, under the ESFS enforcement regime, the ESAs are 
capable of taking direct decisions in the event that (a) EU law that defines clear and 
unconditional obligations is breached (art. 17)
55
; (b) an “emergency situation” occurs (art. 
                                                 
50
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/index_en.htm [Accessed March 15, 2013] 
51
 Regulation 1095/2010 (the ESMA Regulation), rec. 14 (The ESAs’ founding regulations are almost identical. 
For the sake of simplicity, when all ESAs are addressed, references shall be made to the ESMA Regulation 
only). 
52
 The ESMA Regulation, rec. 51. 
53
 For the definition of European agencies, see S. Griller and A. Orator, “Everything Under Control? The ‘way 
forward’ for the European agencies in the footsteps of the Meroni Doctrine” (2010) 35 E.L. Rev. 3, p. 6–9. 
54
 The ESMA Regulation, arts 8(1)(a) and (b). 
55
 The ESMA’s power is a last resort and any decision pursuant to the article must be preceded by and be in 
conformity with a formal opinion issued by the Commission. (art. 17(6)(2)). 
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18)
56
; or (c) national supervisors are in persistent disagreement with each other (art. 19). 
These direct powers cast a shadow of hierarchy over the national regulators and can 
facilitate compliance, even if the exercise of the powers is in many ways constrained and 
controlled. Direct intervention powers as a rule are not supposed to result in legal 
instruments of general effect and application, but a recently decided case demonstrated well 
how drawing the border between executive acts of non-general application and generally 
applicable regulatory acts can be difficult.
57
 
Can maximum harmonization be flexible? 
The ESFS was set to tackle first and foremost the first shortcoming of the Lamfalussy 
process, i.e. the lack of uniformity and inconsistent supervisory practices. In the build-up 
phase of the new supervisory architecture, the Commission explicitly stated the need to 
identify and remove “exceptions, derogations, additions, or ambiguities” from the financial 
services directives and expressed its desire to replace them with a level-playing field based 
on one harmonized core set of standards.
58
 Member States should continue to be able to 
require additional information or impose more stringent requirements (“gold plating”) but 
only when legislative acts so provide.
59
 Thus while the “single rulebook” is admittedly an 
                                                 
56
 The existence of an emergency situation must be determined by the Council (art. 18(2)). 
57
 Certain direct powers of the ESMA under the Short Selling Regulation were challenged by the UK, but in its 
recent judgement the Court held that such executive measures, even if generally applicable, were in the 
confines of EU law. United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (C-270/12) January 22, 2014. 
58
 European Commission, European financial supervision (2009), pp. 3–4. 
59
 As stated in the Directive 2010/78/EU L 331/120 (Omnibus I Directive), rec. 14. 
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EU slogan with little palpable substance
60
, it does carry the hallmark of the EU policy to 
regulate financial markets to the extent possible with a single set of mandatory rules. 
Success of the ESFS is nevertheless closely related to resolving the second shortcoming of 
the Lamfalussy approach, i.e. the avoidance of unnecessary detail and prescriptiveness in 
level 1 legislative acts. But are not these two goals, flexibility and consistency, mutually 
exclusive? Indeed, in substantive terms, uniformity and flexibility locate at the opposing 
ends of a single continuum.
61
 Within this one-dimensional continuum uniformity would be 
achievable by way of detailed and specific legislative packages with as little optionality and 
ambiguity as possible. Such an approach would be an effective way to impose a single 
rulebook, but it would suffer from similar problems than did the “too slow, too rigid, 
complex, and ill-adapted” EU regulatory framework that the Lamfalussy initiatives were 
specifically designed to eliminate. Experiences from the Lamfalussy era indicate that if the 
EU wishes to increase flexibility of legislative acts without giving way to inconsistent and 
less integrated financial market, it needs to assume greater authority over implementation, 
interpretation, and enforcement of EU financial law. The ESFS provides a supervisory 
structure that appears better equipped to do exactly that.  
But structural and institutional reforms only provide the necessary means. Any system of 
delegation is redundant without enabling legislative acts that surrender meaningful 
normative authority to independent regulators. Indeed, flexibility of the ESFS rests on 
                                                 
60
 E. Wymeersch, “Europe’s New Financial Regulatory Bodies” (2011) 11 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
443, p. 449. Wymeersch is admittedly right in criticizing the concept of its substantive ambivalence, noting 
that “[r]ather than a rulebook, it would be a collection of discrete instruments, each having its own dynamics, 
definitions, structure and sanctioning.” 
61
 G. De Búrca and J. Scott, “Introduction”, in De Búrca and Scott (eds), Constitutional Change in the EU: 
from Uniformity to Flexibility (Oxfod: Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 2. 
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willingness of the EU legislators to surrender control over the substance of EU law by way 
of adopting more functional, outcome-oriented and principles-based provisions.  
Certainly, from the perspective of Member States, the fact that the EU places rule-making 
authority within the nascent Eurocracy does not make regulation any more flexible in 
substantive terms. On the contrary, this increases not only the number of rules but also 
probably their prescriptiveness. However, within the EU such reorganization and 
reallocation of regulatory authority does increase procedural flexibility of rule-making and 
improves the regulator’s capacity to invoke centralized, uniform reactions to changed 
circumstances without overt dependence on legislative activity and the bargaining it entails.  
The following two Sections will examine more closely the rule-making powers of the 
ESMA with the help of two case studies. 
Harmonization through delegated law-making: the role of the ESMA 
Lifting technical standards to the domain of binding Union law 
The ESFS, in combination with the Lisbon Treaty’s hierarchy of norms, provides efficient 
means to achieve uniformity: technical standards can now be issued in the form of binding 
Union acts. Within its wide and somewhat amorphous mandate
62
, the ESMA participates in 
development of binding delegated acts and implementing acts, which fall under the TFEU 
category of “non-legislative acts” of general application (arts 290 and 291).  
                                                 
62
 The ESMA Regulation, rec 9. The mandate under art. 1(2) lists practically the entire set of EU legislation 
dealing with securities markets but goes even further by including “all directives, regulations, and decisions 
based on those acts, and of any further legally binding Union act which confers tasks on the Authority.” The 
ESMA can also act in relation to issues not explicitly covered by legislation, such as corporate governance and 
auditing and financial reporting (art. 1(3)). 
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First of all, a legislative act can delegate to the Commission the power to adopt delegated 
acts, i.e. “non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-
essential elements of the legislative act”. To preserve institutional balance, the delegating act 
must explicitly define the objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of power. 
Delegation of power cannot concern essential elements. (TFEU Art. 290(1) and (2)). 
More precisely, there are two kinds of delegated act that the ESMA can develop. The 
traditional way is that the Commission that has been vested with delegated powers 
specifically invites the ESMA to give technical advice. A formal request from the 
Commission identifies the basis and boundaries of the request and also reserves the right to 
revise the mandate if necessary.
63
 On these occasions, the ESMA exercises an advisory 
function by and large similar to that of its predecessor, the CESR.  
Alternatively, a legislative act may also directly appoint the ESMA to develop so-called 
regulatory technical standards. Under this procedure set forth by the ESMA Regulation (arts. 
10 to 14) the ESMA’s advisory function turns into something more institutional. Importantly, 
such a legislative authorisation sidesteps the Commission by depriving it of its power of 
initiative.
64
 Under the special procedure set forth in the ESMA Regulation, the Commission 
continues to have the power to amend or reject draft ESMA standards, but its powers are 
                                                 
63
 See e.g. European Commission, formal request to ESMA for technical advice on possible delegated acts 
concerning the amended Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC). 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/prospectus/esmaadv_en.pdf [Accessed March 15, 2013]. 
64
 This difference is emphasized by Eddy Wymeersch who distinguishes between, what he calls “Commission-
only” acts and “ESA plus Commission” acts. See E. Wymeersch, “The European Financial Supervisory 
Authorities or ESAs”, in Wymeersch, Hopt, and Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-
Crisis Analysis (2012), pp. 250–251.  
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subject to constraints, both explicit and implicit.
65
 In any event, the Commission cannot 
intervene without prior coordination with the ESMA.
66
  
Notwithstanding this, the ESMA still lacks the legislative mandate. Therefore any direct 
authorization must be accompanied by a formal delegation to the Commission to adopt the 
standards as delegated acts.
67
 Standards become binding after they are endorsed by the 
Commission and published in the Official Journal. In addition, delegations of power are 
subject to safeguard provisions: either the Council or the Parliament can revoke a delegation 
of power and veto a delegated act adopted by the Commission within a period set by the 
ESMA Regulation (or a subsequent legislative act).
68
 In principle, the delegation of power to 
the Commission to adopt ESMA regulatory technical standards is limited to four years, but 
the period extends automatically.
69
 
In addition to regulatory technical standards, which can amend or supplement the relevant 
legislative act, the ESMA can develop implementing technical standards. These are based on 
the implementing acts procedure under Article 291 TFEU which enables adoption of certain 
acts to “create uniform conditions for the implementation of legislative acts”. Implementing 
                                                 
65
 The ESMA Regulation goes so far as to suggest that interfering with a draft regulation might happen only 
under “very restricted and extraordinary circumstances” (rec. (22)). Rec. 23 further states that draft technical 
standards may be subject to amendment if they are incompatible with Union law, do not respect the principle 
of proportionality or run counter to the fundamental principles of the internal market for financial services. 
66
 The ESMA Regulation, art. 10(1). 
67
 However, here the the Commission must observe the procedural requirements set forth in arts 10 to 14 of the 
ESMA Regulation. 
68
 The ESMA Regulation arts 12 and 13. For Robert Schütze the Parliament’s enhanced role under art. 290 
TFEU amounts, from a democratic point of view, to a “constitutional revolution”. See R. Schütze, “’Delegated’ 
Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis” (2011) 74 MLR 661, p. 685.     
69
 The ESMA Regulation, art. 11. 
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acts are executive measures in the sense that they cannot amend or supplement the act in 
question.
70
 The development of implementing technical standards under the ESMA 
Regulation (art. 15) follows a similar procedure to the development of regulatory standards 
but with a significant difference in that the Council and Parliament are not allowed to 
intervene.
71
 
Whether binding technical standards will be developed and adopted as delegated acts or 
implementing acts depends solely on the authorizing provision in the relevant legislative act. 
In legislative vernacular the power to adopt delegated acts is “delegated” whereas the power 
to adopt implementing acts is “conferred”. 
Case 1. Shareholders’ disclosure regime 
The Transparency Directive
72
 establishes a minimum level of transparency with regard to 
major shareholdings in Europe’s public companies. It requires that shareholders notify the 
issuer when the amount of shares held reaches, exceeds or falls below certain thresholds. 
The prevailing transparency regime was originally premised on close connection between 
shareholders’ economic and voting interests. However, equity derivatives and similar 
financial instruments have made it possible to “decouple” voting rights from economic 
ownership (e.g. right to receive dividends). And because disclosure rules usually address 
                                                 
70
 Though implementing and delegating acts are mutually exclusive Union acts, it is not always easy to 
distinguish them in substantive terms. P. Craig, EU Administrative Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 
2012), pp. 134–35. 
71
 These executive measures are exercised and controlled under the updated comitology regime, i.e. by the 
Member States through representative committees. See Regulation 182/2011 laying down the rules and general 
principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of 
implementing powers [2011] OJ L 55/13. 
72
 Directive 2004/109/EC, OJ L390/38 (as amended). 
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voting power rather than economic interest, the latter may not always be disclosed to issuers 
and markets.
73
 In other words, depending on the position, an investor could hold voting 
power in the company without having a corresponding economic interest, or vice versa. In 
2010 the issue of “hidden ownership” was put forward by the CESR, which expressed 
increasing concern at potential use of certain financial instruments in acquiring or exercising 
undisclosed influence in a listed company or allowing for creeping control.
74
 
In line with the issues raised by the CESR and the proposal it put forward, the Commission 
proposed in 2011 a modification of the Transparency Directive with the aim of extending 
the substantive scope of the shareholders’ disclosure regime.75 In the final version of the 
Directive the definition of financial instruments was extended to all instruments “with 
similar economic effect” to holding of shares and entitlements to acquire shares.76 The 
change was needed to ensure that in spite of innovative financial instruments issuers and 
investors continue to have full knowledge of the structure of corporate ownership.
77
 Newer 
                                                 
73
 H.T.C Hu, “Hedge funds, insiders, and the decoupling of economic and voting ownership: Empty voting and 
hidden (morphable) ownership” (2007) 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 343. 
74
 In effect, the CESR was concerned that a significant degree of de facto control could be exerted indirectly 
via the voting rights attached to shares held as a hedge against long economic exposures created by certain 
derivative instruments. CESR, Proposal to extend major shareholding notifications to instruments of similar 
economic effect to holding shares and entitlements to acquire shares CESR/09-1215b, p.6.  
75
 Proposal for a directive amending Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements 
in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and 
Commission Directive 2007/14/EC COM(2011) 683 final. 
76
 Under art. 13(1)(b) of the revised Transparency Directive 2013/50/EU the notification requirements shall 
apply to a natural person or legal entity who holds, directly or indirectly financial instruments which are 
referenced to shares falling under the provision’s scope (art. 13(1)(a)) and which have similar economic effect 
to those shares, whether or not they confer a right to a physical settlement. 
77
 Directive 2013/50/EU, Rec. (9). 
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definition was designed to capture any present or future derivative positions that are 
referenced to listed shares. 
Pros and cons of the reform have been listed elsewhere.
78
 For the purposes of this article, the 
adopted “economic effect” test provides a good example of a more flexible regulatory 
approach where open-ended legislative provisions are adopted to increase the capacity of the 
regulatory regime to react to changed circumstances. With a shift of focus from a legal form 
of a financial instrument to its economic effect, the regulator would no longer rely on 
legislative activity to balance the check brought about by an innovative financial instrument. 
However, at the same time this formula exposes the legal certainty trade-off that such open-
ended provisions entail: it would be difficult for a market participant to anticipate which 
financial instruments are considered, from the regulator’s point of view, as having the 
required economic effect. If the issue was left solely to the discretion of national regulators, 
or alternatively to be judged ex post by national courts or competent authorities in 
enforcement actions, the regime would most likely suffer from inconsistency. Again, the 
issuers and holding companies could opt for the loosest regime. 
To mitigate problems of uncertainty and diversity, the Directive provides that the ESMA 
shall establish and periodically update an indicative list of financial instruments that are 
subject to notification requirements taking into account technical developments on financial 
markets.
79
 Such a list would not be legally binding (hence “indicative”) and it is not entirely 
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 For a critical perspective, see D. Zetzsche, “Against Mandatory Disclosure of Economic-only Positions 
Referenced to Shares of European Issuers – Twenty Arguments against the CESR Proposal” (2010) 11 EBOR 
231.  
79
 Directive 2013/50/EU, art. 9(b)(1a)(2)(a) and (b). In the original proposal the Comission was delegated the 
power to explicitly specify by way of a delegated act which kind of financial instruments would have been 
considered as having the required economic effect. In the final version this provision was dropped. 
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clear how it would be maintained, but in practice the list will likely provide important 
guidance. However, the ESMA shall develop also draft regulatory technical standards to 
specify the cases where certain exemptions are applicable as well to specify the methods for 
calculating the number of voting rights in certain specific cases.
80
 
The regulatory technique applied in the modified Transparency Directive is not an isolated 
case. For instance, under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)
81
 the 
ESMA develops standards for determining the classes of derivatives that should be subject 
to the clearing obligation (art. 5).
82
 The ESMA also exercises substantial discretion in 
determining the preconditions for extraterritorial reach of EMIR, which is to apply to certain 
contracts entered into between non-EU entities, but which are considered to have a “direct, 
substantial and foreseeable effect” within the Union, or where it is necessary to prevent 
regulatory arbitrage (art. 4(4)). The ESMA’s standards pursuant to Prospectus Directive83, as 
amended, also concern many non-technical matters, perhaps most far-reaching being the 
power to develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify “situations where a 
significant new factor, material mistake or inaccuracy relating to the information included in 
the prospectus requires a supplement to the prospectus to be published” (art. 16).84 
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 Directive 2013/50/EU art. 9(d)(4)(2)) and 9(b)(1b)(2). 
81
 Regulation 648/2012 of 4 July 2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and trade repositories 
[2011] OJ L 201/1. 
82
 Rec. 16, Regulation 648/2012 (“On the basis of draft regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA, 
the Commission should decide whether a class of OTC derivative contract is to be subject to a clearing 
obligation[…]”). 
83
 Directive 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted 
to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC [2003] L 345/64 
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 Omnibus I Directive, art. 5(7). 
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Convergence through non-binding instruments 
Interpretative authority of the ESMA non-binding guidance 
Unlike the ESAs’ powers to develop binding technical standards, which are somewhat 
circumscribed, their power to issue non-binding guidelines and recommendations is much 
less regulated.
85
 In many respects, the ESMA’s soft law powers are in substance similar to 
those of its forerunner the CESR.
86
 The CESR’s activities in the context of supervisory 
convergence developed organically and resulted in an impressive amount of non-binding 
guidance.
87
 Because of their de facto legal effects, CESR guidelines and recommendations 
were described as quasi-binding or even as a secondary source of law.
88
 The CESR itself 
held that its non-binding measures might have indirect legal effects, inter alia, through their 
interpretative force or by way of creating legitimate expectations with a view to increasing 
the predictability of the competent authorities’ actions.89 
The ESMA continues to have the power, at its own initiative and within its substantive 
mandate, to issue guidelines, recommendations, opinions, and other convergence 
instruments. These can be formulated as general and declaratory comments or, alternatively, 
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 Busuioc, “Rule-Making by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope” (2013) 
19 E.L.J. 111. 
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 The CESR’s power to issue non-binding guidance was formally recognized only in 2009 by the Commission 
Decision 2009/77/EC (art. 3). 
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 Moloney, “The Committee of European Securities Regulators and level 3 of the Lamfalussy Process” in 
Tison, De Wulf, Van der Elst, Steennot (eds), Perspectives in Company Law and Financial Regulation: Essays 
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 T.M.J. Möllers, “Sources of Law in European Securities Regulation – Effective Regulation, Soft Law and 
Legal Taxonomy from Lamfalussy to de Larosière” (2010) 11 EBOR  379, p. 385. 
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 CESR, MiFID Level 3 Expert Group Workplan for Q4/2007 – 2008, CESR/07-704c. 
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be addressed directly to competent authorities or financial market participants. None of these 
instruments are legally binding (i.e. enforceable), but their effect is bolstered by an explicit 
“comply-or-explain” regime: the competent authorities and financial market participants are 
under an explicit statutory obligation to make every effort to comply with ESMA guidelines 
and recommendations.
90
 The authorities must always notify the ESMA whether they intend 
to comply with them or, alternatively, state reasons for non-compliance.
91
 The ESMA’s 
ability to publish the stated reasons for non-compliance provides a gentle pressure 
mechanism. Furthermore, if specifically required by a guideline or recommendation, also 
financial market participants must report whether they are compliant.
92
 
The ESMA Regulation states that the purpose of ESMA non-binding acts is to promote 
common and efficient supervisory practices and contribute to uniform and consistent 
application of EU law (art. 16(1)).
93
 This implicitly confers on the ESMA a degree of 
interpretative authority. The fact that Member States often had their own different 
interpretations of the same legal texts was one of the key deficiencies that the ESFS was 
designed to overcome.
94
 The following case study illustrates with a recent example how the 
ESMA pursues this goal with the help of interpretative authority conferred on it. 
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 The ESMA Regulation, art. 16(3)(1). 
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 The ESMA Regulation, art. 16(3)(2). 
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 The ESMA Regulation, arts. 16(3)(3) and 16(4). 
93
 A similar provision was included in the Commission decision of 6 June 2001 establishing the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators [2001] OJ L191/43. 
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 The ESMA Regulation, rec. (8). 
  
29 
Case 2. Defining the key concepts of the AIFMD 
Implementation of the directive on alternative investment fund managers (“AIFMD”)95 
provides a good example of how post-legislative determination of the exact scope of EU law 
might not always be preserved for binding acts or courts. 
The AIFMD extends EU regulation of investment funds to alternative investment funds such 
as hedge funds and private equity, which have remained largely unregulated at the EU level. 
The directive’s scope is wide as it is designed to cover management of all kinds of 
investment funds not regulated by the UCITS
96
 regime and concerns all funds irrespective of 
their legal structure or the manner in which they are established (e.g. statute, contract, 
trust).
97
 This broad objective risks the scope of the directive becoming over-inclusive as 
there are arguably investment funds that are not alarming from the perspective of investor 
protection or systemic risk. The AIFMD acknowledges this by presenting certain specific 
carve-outs (art. 2(3)) and quantitative threshold exemptions (art. 3). However, it is the 
definition of alternative investment funds (AIFs) that is crucial for determining the 
Directive’s personal scope because the Directive applies generally to all AIF managers, 
which are defined as “legal persons whose regular business is managing one or more 
AIFs”.98 That said, Article 4(1)(a) defines AIFs as non-UCITS collective investment 
undertakings (including their investment compartments), which raise capital from a number 
of investors, with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for 
the benefit of those investors.  
                                                 
95
 Directive 2011/61/EU [2011], O.J L174/1 (AIFMD). 
96
 Directive 2009/65/EC [2009], OJ L302/3. 
97
 AIFMD, rec. (3). 
98
 It should be noted that the Directive does not regulate AIFs as such but only their managers. 
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The definition of AIF, though relatively conclusive in its basic objectives, includes 
undefined and open-ended terms such as “investment policy” and “raising capital” which 
could be interpreted inconsistently in different jurisdictions. This could cause some variance 
in the exact scope of the Directive’s application and open possibilities for legal arbitrage. 
The ESMA’s intervention seeks to avoid this. Pursuant to direct authorization in the AIFMD 
(art. 4(4)), the ESMA has prepared regulatory technical standards concerning the types of 
AIFM covered by the directive. However, the ESMA determined after consultations that 
technical standards should only comprise limited issues
99
 while most matters would be 
better resolved in the form of guidelines. The final guidelines on “key concepts” of the 
AIFMD was issued in August 2013.
100
  
The guidelines aim to ensure common, uniform and consistent application of the concepts 
included in the definition of AIF.
101
 It sets out clarification as to terms such as “raising 
capital”, “collective investment”, “number of investors” and “defined investment policy”, 
each term being directly extracted from the above stated definition of “AIF” in the 
legislative text. According to the ESMA, these definitions of key concepts should be taken 
                                                 
99
 The final draft regulatory technical standard by the ESMA concerns only clarification as to differentiation 
between AIFMs managing closed-ended AIFs and/or open-ended AIFs. ESMA, Final Report: Draft regulatory 
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into account in determining whether or not an entity falls under the definition of AIF, and 
therefore within the scope of the AIFMD.
102
 
Rather than going into the detail of the individual definitions, it is important here to note that 
it is not unusual for the scope of EU securities regulation to be determined by non-binding 
guidelines or other “convergence tools”. The choice not to incorporate the majority of the 
scope-related issues in binding standards might be justified from the perspective of both 
proportionality and subsidiarity, but what is interesting is that this decision was seemingly 
within the ESMA’s discretionary powers. 
The use of a soft law instruments in implementing the AIFMD is not an isolated case either. 
The ESMA regularly provides interpretative guidance with respect to complex definitions 
adopted in legislative texts. Another recent example of such an exercise of quasi-
authoritative interpretation is the ESMA guidelines on the scope of exemption for market 
making activities and primary market operations under the Short Selling Regulation.
103
 On 
the other hand, abundant guidance documents adopted by the CESR remind how this 
phenomenon was an established practice well before the establishment of the ESFS and the 
ESAs.
104
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Discussion: striking the limits of flexibility 
The above analysis showed different techniques by which the scope and content of EU 
financial legislation can be made more adaptable to changed circumstances. One technique 
is embedded in the TFEU framework of “non-legislative acts” (TFEU arts 290 and 291). 
Although the ESAs lack powers to adopt formal laws of general application, the legal status 
of binding technical standards is clear. There is nothing quasi-legal in delegated acts or 
implementing acts adopted by the Commission – both are directly applicable Union acts. 
Soft law instruments provide another technique that can also increase flexibility, but in a 
more elusive way. First, they do not require formal legislative mandates or Commission 
invitations. Secondly, soft law brings flexibility through its ambiguous legal status. These 
techniques and their respective limits and challenges will be assessed next. 
Doctrinal and legal boundaries of delegation 
An efficient system of delegated legislation presupposes a body of legislation that delegates 
meaningful power to the Commission and the ESAs to act as subordinate regulators. A 
review of recently adopted EU financial legislation indicates that the practice of delegating 
regulatory power to the Commission has become widespread especially in the area of 
financial regulation.
105
 For instance, at the time of writing this article, the Commission had 
already adopted nine technical standards and two delegated acts under the EMIR alone.
 
The 
AIFMD provides an extreme example, as the directive delegates or confers to the 
Commission the power to adopt delegated acts or implementing acts in more than fifty 
different provisions. While most measures concern highly technical issues, delegated acts 
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also include contentious issues such as corporate governance, risk management and general 
principles concerning operating conditions.
106
 
The rationale for increased presence of non-legislative acts is simple if viewed against the 
background of the EU single rulebook policy. The ESMA Regulation refers to a need to 
“introduce an effective instrument” to achieve the single rulebook.107 By lifting most 
technical standards to the realm of binding acts, the scope of uniformity is significantly 
expanded. Because standards are adopted as regulations, the problem of divergent 
transpositions is avoided. Delegating regulatory authority to the EU administration also 
increases flexibility of the regulatory system. In identifying areas of existing legislation that 
would be suitable for new kinds of binding standard, the Commission stated expressly that 
technical standards were needed in areas where it would be important to have flexibility to 
respond rapidly to market developments or have the option to do so in the future.
108
 
However, despite the clear link between the TFEU and the ESAs’ binding technical 
standards, certain procedural aspects render their normative relationship problematic. The 
ESAs’ Regulatory technical standards are somewhat alien to the TFEU framework for 
“ordinary” delegated acts because of the additional constraints on the Commission’s power. 
In practice, these constraints are largely offset by several limitations on the ESMA’s 
regulatory powers. Nevertheless, the Commission has been concerned at limitations on its 
authority in adoption of regulatory standards, expressing repeatedly serious doubts as to 
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whether these restrictions are in line with arts 290 and 291 of the TFEU.
109
 But beyond this, 
constitutional problems concerning new forms of delegation are surrounded by awkward 
silence.
110
 
Another important aspect of delegation is the range of issues delegated acts and 
implementing acts can comprise. Implementing acts are executive acts, which cannot amend 
legislation but only facilitate their implementation.
111
 Delegated acts, on the other hand, are 
quasi-legislative in the sense that they can amend or supplement the non-essential parts of 
legislative acts. This requirement also concerns the ESA regulatory technical standards, 
which are adopted as delegated acts.
112
 But the fact that technical standards are developed by 
an ESA, a Union agency, raises additional limitations. Any delegation of power to the ESAs 
must conform to general judicial safeguards established for rule-making by European 
agencies. The principle rooted in the Meroni decisions by the European Court of Justice 
prohibits a delegation to agencies of wide discretionary powers involving policy choices.
113
 
In subsequent jurisprudence Meroni has stood for a constitutional non-delegation 
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doctrine.
114
 Though it may well be questioned whether jurisprudence more than fifty years 
old should be considered as a sufficient foundation to justify limits on European agencies’ 
powers
115
 the case law of the EU courts evidences that “Meroni remains good law”.116 
A recent case UK v Parliament and Council decided by the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Justice confirmed that Meroni principles continue to limit delegation of 
discretionary powers to the EU agencies.
117
 Importantly, however, the Court confirmed for 
the first time that the institutional framework established by the TFEU, in particular the 
enhanced judicial safeguards, expressly permits Union agencies to adopt acts of general 
application.
118
 The case did not concern the ESMA’s role in developing non-legislative acts 
of general application (arts 290 and 291 TFEU) or its soft law powers, but rather its power 
to issue individual decisions of temporary effect but which are also generally applicable.
119
 
Meroni requirements are acknowledged also in the regulations establishing the ESAs. The 
scope of technical standards must be delimited by the legislative acts on which they are 
based and the delegated power should only concern purely technical issues. All strategic 
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decisions or policy choices should be made in legislation.
120
 Finally, the non-delegation 
principle gains further strength if taken beyond questions of EU institutional balance and 
viewed as a principle deriving from constitutional principles common to all Member States. 
By limiting material discretion that can be delegated to the Commission (and even more so 
to the ESAs), the existing delegation doctrine sets outer substantive boundaries for the 
development of more flexible EU financial legislation. The more substantive and non-
technical that binding technical standards become, the harder they will be to accommodate 
within the framework of EU primary law and general principles of EU law. 
Given the Treaty constraints, the majority of delegated acts are likely to remain technical. 
Another possible result of the more formalistic delegation doctrine could be that substantive 
decisions requiring exercise of discretion are increasingly made on the quasi-regulatory level 
of ESA guidelines and recommendations, the issuance of which is neither dependent on 
formal delegations. Guidelines and recommendations are neither subject to the mandatory 
review by the Commission or the legislators’ veto-powers. But as the regulatory weight of 
EU agencies increases, their unregulated flexibility and lack of procedural constraints are 
meeting increasing demands for enhanced controls. 
Limits of soft convergence 
The other regulatory technique identified above promotes convergence and adaptability 
through instruments that fall under the category of soft law acts. The standard definition of 
soft law provides that it encompasses rules of conduct, which in principle lack legally 
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binding force but which may have practical effects.
121
 As a regulatory technique, soft law is 
post-legislative in the sense that it aims to provide general guidance on the proper 
interpretation and application of existing EU law.
122
 
Because of its expressly non-binding status, the effectiveness of ESA guidance instruments 
rests largely on them being incorporated into the national regimes of the Member States by 
their own competent authorities. In that regard, their success continues to be limited.
123
 Even 
when the guidance is adopted, different Member States can transpose them in various ways. 
But even if ESA recommendations, guidelines, Q&As, opinions and other such acts are 
quasi-regulatory at best, that does not mean that they are legally irrelevant. EU case law has 
granted soft law acts an explicit interpretative function.
124
 This article cannot address all the 
complexities and uncertainties of giving (indirect) legal effect to EU soft law.
125
  But it is 
generally agreed that the term non-binding does not equal absence of legal effects, though 
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the nature and extent of the legal effects of EU soft law requires case-by-case assessment 
and contextual analysis.
126
  
From the point of view of flexibility, it is important to note that many advantages of soft law 
are brought about by its inherent ambiguity, which allows soft law to escape the dualistic 
black-and-white dichotomy of law and non-law. Paradoxically, because soft law is less 
concrete, it can be harder to circumvent. The ESMA guidelines on key concepts of AIFMD 
again provides an apt example: while determining the directive’s scope by way of defining 
some of its key concepts, the guidelines specifically state that competent authorities and 
market participants should not consider that the absence of any one of the stated 
characteristics would conclusively demonstrate that an undertaking does not fall under the 
scope of the AIFMD. The guidelines therefore only “illustrate and explain in more detail the 
characteristics likely to lead to an undertaking being considered an AIF”.127 Such an 
approach leaves discretion to national authorities to revise the scope if necessary and, 
importantly, makes gaming by the market participants around the directive more difficult. 
Soft post-legislative instruments benefit the regulated community by alleviating legal 
uncertainty. It provides necessary information on the scope of vaguely drafted legal 
provisions or “framework” norms. But whilst being informative, in the absence of 
agreement on, or established procedures for determining, the legal effects of soft law 
instruments or their admissibility to judicial review, soft law may also create a more 
fundamental kind of uncertainty. Such uncertainty concerns who can dictate the content of 
EU law and under what circumstances should various soft law acts give rise to observable 
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legal rights and obligations. To that end, a more formalistic approach could enhance legal 
certainty. But in the post-Lisbon Union, the asymmetry between procedural requirements for 
adopting binding Union acts (including non-legislative acts of the Commission) and non-
binding administrative measures seems to be increasing rather than decreasing.
128
  
Genuine rule-making agencies are alien to the EU administration and, absent a Treaty 
revision, continue to be so. But there are at least two ways to “harden” soft law without 
giving it a status as hard law. One is facilitating their judicial review, which in principle 
turns a soft measure into a hard one.
129
 The other is subjecting their adoption and 
promulgation to similar procedural requirements as binding rules and regulations. These two 
methods are also linked, in that treating soft law acts procedurally as law-like can increase 
the probability of Courts reviewing them and assigning them indirect legal effect. The Court 
usually prefers substance to form. 
That being said, the future of EU soft law seems much harder than its past: there is rising 
awareness that the lack of controls and safeguards for EU soft law, both ex ante and ex post, 
is untenable given its increasing practical and legal relevance. Principles of democracy, now 
an important part of the TEU (title II), call for more transparency, legitimacy, participation 
and predictability in the realm of informal rule-making. In particular, the lack of established 
minimum procedural guarantees has been identified as the key problem of EU 
                                                 
128
 As professor Chiti observes, the adoption of binding implementing rules is becoming more proceduralised, 
whereas adoption of soft law measures still remains informal. Chiti, “European Agencies’ Rulemaking: Powers, 
Procedures and Assessment” 19 E.L.J. (2013) 93, p. 104. 
129
 Snyder, “The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques” in 
T. Daintith (ed), Implementing EC Law in the United Kingdom: Structures for Indirect Rule (1995), pp. 65–66. 
  
40 
administration and a case is increasingly being made for “constitutionalising” the different 
forms of EU rule-making.
130
 
ESA guidelines, recommendations and other convergence instruments seem to operate 
largely outside the Treaty framework. However, in drafting them the ESAs must, “where 
appropriate”, follow procedures that are similar to those it is bound to follow in drafting 
binding technical standards. The measures can include open and public consultations, 
stakeholder consultations, and cost-benefit analyses
131
 and they must be proportionate in 
relation to the scope, nature and impact of the guidelines or recommendations.
132
 The ESA 
regulations further provide that all decision-making should be bound by Union rules and 
general principles on due process and transparency.
133
 Procedural constraints to the ESA’s 
soft law function are somewhat vague but logical in a symmetrical sense: the adoption of 
non-binding instruments is subject to non-binding procedural requirements. In its Public 
Statement of Consultation Practices, the ESMA has underlined the need to uphold a flexible 
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and proportionate approach to consultation practices that can be adapted according to the 
issue at hand.
134
 Binding standards for pre-adoption procedures could thus jeopardise some 
of the procedural flexibility of the ESMAs’ post-legislative rule-making. 
More generally, the fact that “better regulation” principles must already be taken into 
account when the ESAs’ non-binding instruments are developed speaks more generally for 
the increasing acknowledgement of their regulatory role. Their recognized importance is 
perhaps best revealed by the fact that ESA guidance must be adopted by a qualified majority 
decision of the Board of Supervision; draft binding technical standards must meet the same 
requirement.
135
 The European Parliament has also called for the treatment of ESA guidance 
to be “as binding as possible on national supervisory authorities”.136 
Even if EU soft law-making remains highly informal, its flexibility is not completely 
unregulated, but principles-based. Soft law acts do not provide a range of suitable 
interpretations for the courts and authorities to invoke unilaterally whenever their content 
meets their own needs and predispositions. The principles of legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations provide obvious safeguards in this respect. On the other hand, compliance with 
the letter of guidelines and recommendations should neither be perceived as an absolute safe 
haven for regulated firms, i.e. if they clearly contradict binding rules. Indeed, determination 
of legal effects of soft law continues to require difficult balancing between high-level, hard 
                                                 
134
 ESMA, Public Statement of Consultation Practices (ESMA/2011/11). 
135
 The ESMA Regulation, art. 44(1). As a rule, decisions are made by simple majority. 
136
 European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a European Banking Authority, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, (3 June 2010). 
(Rapporteur: José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil). 
  
42 
principles.
137
 The demands for increasing control of EU administrative rulemaking 
nevertheless signal a departure from a principles-based model towards a more formal regime. 
Finally, increasing demands for formalising EU soft law could be viewed as reflecting a 
form of synthesis. It is widely acknowledged that the rules and regulations often push 
financial entities to move their activities and assets outside the regulatory perimeter.
138
 But 
the above analysis has indicated that the EU regulator’s role in this regulatory dialectic is 
more complex than is often presumed. Regulatory innovation goes beyond drafting laws and 
regulations, and involves above all innovative regulatory practices, procedures and 
instruments. Such dimensions also form the essence of several New Governance approaches 
and other fashionable regulatory techniques. But as the EU rule-maker moves further away 
from traditional, constitutionally mandated and constrained, legislative procedures, it is 
important to remember that the use of public authority is equally constrained by laws and 
procedural rules.
139
 Therefore, creative compliance might not be a vice of just those subject 
to rules, but also very much of rule-makers themselves. 
 ‘New’ mode of governance: selected trade-offs 
The article has assessed the ability of the EU’s current institutional and regulatory 
architecture to meet the challenging target of combining flexibility with a more integrated 
single financial market and a uniform rulebook. The “EU approach” thus stands for 
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increased control but also for the ability to react to developments that can neither be 
foreseen nor controlled by the regulator. 
In structural or procedural terms, the ESFS seems to carry the potential of increasing the 
ability of EU regulators to adapt the scope of financial laws and prompt concerted efforts in 
reaction to alarming market developments. In terms of substance, however, it is the quality 
and nature of level 1 legislation and the scope of delegating provisions thereunder that 
determine much of the system’s capacity. The analysis of the article has been positive in the 
sense that it has largely avoided more general and normative questions of governance as 
well as particular questions about the rationale behind the post-crisis policy choices. In the 
following some of these issues will be addressed. 
The EU has not been immune to the influence of so-called new governance approaches to 
regulation. After the turn of the millennium, it was even argued that the EU polity was 
undergoing a paradigm change where “uniformity, homogeneity, and one-directional 
integration” was being replaced by flexibility and differentiation.140 In retrospect, however, 
such reports on paradigm change seem greatly exaggerated. Beyond rhetoric and certain 
established experiments (notably the Open Method of Co-ordination), central tenets of New 
Governance has failed to penetrate the mainstream EU policy and law-making.
141
  In 
financial regulation, the Lamfalussy process certainly promoted more network-based and 
perhaps even experimentalist regulatory techniques. It also facilitated the use of soft law 
regulatory instruments. But at the same time the process started to shift rulemaking and 
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supervision from national to multinational level.
142
 Most importantly, Lamfalussy principles 
never really embraced diversity as an ideal, but rather proved ineffective in eradicating it. 
Granted, emphasis is still placed on networks and horizontal governance forms particularly 
in the area of supervisory coordination. The ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors consist of 
representatives of Member States’ competent authorities who can therefore influence 
decision-making directly. Moreover, better regulation principles such as consultations and 
cost-benefit analyses continue to be a regular feature of rules preparation and they 
increasingly concern non-binding measures. What is more, growing resort to soft law 
instruments reflects the importance of more flexible rule-making structures or “hybrid 
instruments” advocated by many new governance strategies. These elements are not recent 
inventions even in the EU.
143
  
Yet the post-crisis architecture of EU financial regulation is hardly constructed with the 
ideals of “experimentalist governance” in mind, in the sense that it would be the role of the 
Member States and their subnational bodies to adapt EU level framework norms to their 
own circumstances.
144
 For example, the ESAs’ soft law measures are meant to promote 
consistent approaches to supervision, even if they tolerate a degree of divergence. Under the 
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ESFS, the legal effect of ESA guidance vís-a-vís national authorities is bolstered by a 
shadow of hierarchy brought about by the ESAs’ enhanced ability to take direct measures 
against national supervisors. The UK’s recent challenge of such powers in the European 
Court of Justice failed.
145
 Indeed, the regulatory structure laid down by the ESFS is anything 
but horizontal, and ideals such as experimentalism and diversity are pretty much the 
antithesis of the EU’s prevailing single rulebook policy. 
However, it is also the more hierarchical, top-down regulatory structure and the pursuit of 
control that provide the source of most significant risks and trade-offs. It is indeed a 
legitimate question if the prevailing one-size-fits-all approach is feasible or even desirable 
given the diversity of supervisory cultures and their respective idiosyncrasies.
146
 Procedural 
flexibility and maximum harmonization are certainly not a panacea for the governance of 
financial markets and choices made involve trade-offs. First, in terms of policy-making and 
legislation, reallocation of regulatory power risks having unintended and counter-productive 
consequences. The ESFS, with the ESAs acting as more independent regulatory agencies, 
absorbs and concentrates regulatory authority vertically vis-à-vis Member States, but also 
fragments power within the EU in horizontal terms. Viewed against the dynamics of EU 
regulatory federalism this development risks further adding to the level of detail of 
regulatory measures. Evidence suggests that horizontal fragmentation of power within the 
Union supports the production of highly detailed rules, which constrain severely Member 
                                                 
145
 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (C-270/12). 
146
 See e.g. Black, “Restructuring Global and EU Financial Regulation: Character, Capacities, and Learning” in 
Wymeersch, Hopt, Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (2012), pp. 
18, 32; M. Andenas and I. H.-Y. Chiu, “Financial Stability and Legal Integration in Financial Regulation” 
(2013) 38 E.L. Rev. 335. 
  
46 
States’ discretion.147 Indeed, from the perspective of Member States, the EU financial 
regulation will not be too flexible. 
Second, keeping delegated measures technical and detailed appears desirable from the point 
of view of democratic legitimacy and accountability. But such a regulatory structure, 
together with the single rulebook policy, also entails an important choice in terms of 
governance in that it turns much of the rule-making into an administrative, technical 
enterprise leaving little to be determined ex post facto.
148
 Technical and detailed regulations 
also effectively eliminate discretion of the Member States’ competent authorities, whose 
ability to exercise supervisory judgement is diminished where not abolished. This risks 
national supervision becoming “mere administrative functionaries”.149 Where a more 
centralized supervisory structure can be more effective in imposing rules for the entire single 
market, it can bind the hands of national authorities too tightly and be inefficient in reacting 
to Member States’ specific needs. 
Third, simple procedural flexibility cannot escape all the problems of regulatory regimes 
based on rigid and inflexible rules. Shorter half-life of rules leads to a rulebook that is 
detailed, thick and complex. Though it is often held that prescriptive rules can provide 
certainty and consistency in application better than vague principles, they also suffer from 
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over and under-inclusiveness, gaps, and rigidity.
150
 An effective system of delegation must 
allow post-legislative fine-tuning in order to increase modifiability of rules. That may 
diminish the problems of inclusiveness, but does not escape the underlying dilemma of 
dialectic feedback patterns: Persistent adapting and transforming of rules result in a 
“mountain of exceptions and patchwork regulations”, the effects of which the market, in turn, 
seeks to mitigate or circumvent.
151
 In theory, given the regulators’ enhanced ability to plug 
loopholes, rent-seeking might be limited to techniques that can generate profits relatively 
easy and demand little resources. 
The fourth problem is that the post-crisis tidal wave of legislative initiatives and various 
implementing measures represent a significant compliance burden for an increasing number 
of regulated firms. Simple frustration might have the effect that “tick the box” approaches 
prevail over regulatory dialogues.
152
 A closely associated risk is that the relationship 
between the regulator and the regulated can become more adversarial rather than less so. 
Finally, the development faces obvious political uncertainties. Games having power and 
sovereignty at stake are often zero-sum in nature. Therefore, as the federalising regulatory 
structure arms EU rule-makers with important powers, it at the same time diminishes the 
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discretion of national regulators and makes their future role more uncertain. The 
development is unlikely to remain as incremental and linear even if far-reaching steps have 
recently been taken in the context of Banking Union project. 
Concluding remarks 
In analysing the development of EU financial rule-making, this article adopted a perspective 
that looks beyond the one-dimensional, substance-focused notion of EU law as an occupant 
of a single continuum with complete uniformity at one end and flexibility at the other.
153
 It is 
unquestionable that the prevailing single rulebook policy, and the maximum harmonization 
agenda it embraces, leave less room for flexibility in terms of discretion left for the Member 
States. Delegated and implementing acts adopted by the Commission are directly applicable 
Union acts and most of their provisions are excessively detailed and technical. As such they 
arguably represent a step towards rigorous uniformity but with no flexibility. But ever since 
the beginning of the Lamfalussy process, the demand for another kind of regulatory 
flexibility has become more visible in the development of EU financial law: the prevailing 
conventional wisdom is that increasingly complex and unpredictable financial markets 
require laws and regulations that are preferably more adaptable and revisable than more 
diverse. Such procedural flexibility is not so much concerned with the level of detail of rules 
but rather with (a) the existence of an effective system of delegation and (b) supportive EU 
legislation that leaves sufficient amount of detail to be filled on lower levels of regulation. 
With regard to (a), the article concludes that the ESFS, leveraged by the TFEU system of 
delegated law-making, seems to have the required flexibility in procedural terms. However, 
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this flexibility is over-shadowed by a number of constitutional and legitimacy problems of 
which the article touched upon a few: the somewhat uneasy normative relationship between 
the ESAs’ technical standards and the TFEU provisions on non-legislative acts (Arts 290 
and 291) as well as the limits which the constitutional non-delegation doctrine imposes on 
discretionary powers of the ESAs. 
With regard to (b), the non-exhaustive analysis made above does not enable the deduction of 
the direction of a general trend. But as noted, there are good examples of more open-ended, 
functional and outcome-oriented provisions that allow post-legislative perimeter control via 
the nascent EU financial administration. The modified shareholders’ disclosure regime 
under the revised Transparency Directive serves as an ideal type. 
Finally, much of the convergence of EU financial law continues to be coordinated by post-
legislative soft law instruments issued by the ESAs. With most technical standards lifted to 
the domain of binding Union law, the ESAs’ role as quasi-authoritative interpreters of EU 
financial law probably becomes more visible. Determination by the ESMA of the key 
concepts of the AIFMD with non-binding guidelines is a telling example. Such explicit 
impositions of interpretative authority are unlikely to go unnoticed in Member States.
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Moreover, the highly informal nature of EU soft law has raised demands for setting 
minimum standards for pre-adoption procedures and better access to courts. While better 
safeguards would bring EU soft law more firmly in line with the EU constitutional 
principles, creeping formalism can deprive the ESAs of some of their rule-making flexibility. 
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